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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 We granted Lawrence L. Simmons' request for a 
certificate of probable cause and now must decide: (1) whether 
voir dire transcripts, missing after a 13-year delay between 
Simmons' sentencing and direct appeal, are indispensable to 
review his claim that the prosecution improperly exercised its 
peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from the jury, 
and (2) whether this delay violated Simmons' constitutional right 
to due process and a speedy appeal.1  The district court denied 
Simmons' reopened petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We will 
reverse because, although the district court correctly concluded 
that Simmons' right to due process was violated, it erred by 
concluding that the violation was cured when Simmons received his 
direct appeal.   
 I. 
 In 1977, Simmons was sentenced to life imprisonment 
plus 21 to 25 years.  Although immediately after sentencing he 
expressed his desire to appeal, and never waived his right to 
appeal, Simmons' conviction and sentence were not reviewed for 13 
years.  His appointed trial counsel did not file a notice of 
appeal or promptly transfer Simmons' case to the appellate 
                     
1
.  Simmons additionally asserts claims based on alleged 
violations of his Miranda and Fifth Amendment rights, inability 
to review the effect of pre-trial publicity, governmental 
misconduct, verdicts against the weight of the evidence, errors 
in the jury instructions, other errors during trial, and the 
denial of his motions to examine the jurors and for a new trial.  
We have reviewed these claims and conclude that they are without 
merit. 
  
division of the New Jersey Public Defender.  Thereafter, despite 
requests from Simmons and his trial counsel, the Public Defender 
failed to promptly seek an appeal.  Ultimately, the federal 
district court granted Simmons a conditional writ of habeas 
corpus, directing that a writ would issue unless the state gave 
him an appeal or a new trial.  Thus, after he had pursued 
collateral review in the state and federal courts from 1980 to 
1988, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division finally 
permitted Simmons to file a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc.  
After spending more than a decade in prison, Simmons was granted 
his first appeal as of right. 
 By this time, however, portions of the trial record 
including a lengthy in camera voir dire of prospective jurors 
were missing.  The Appellate Division remanded the case for the 
limited purpose of reconstructing the record, and the judges who 
had presided over the jury selection and the remainder of the 
trial and sentencing held reconstruction hearings.  Simmons 
challenged the sufficiency of the reconstructed record in federal 
district court, but his motion was denied without prejudice to 
his right to challenge the record in the state appellate 
proceedings.  In 1990, the Appellate Division affirmed Simmons' 
conviction and sentence, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied 
his petition for certification.  In 1991, the United States 
Supreme Court denied Simmons' petition for a writ of certiorari.  
The district court then denied his reopened petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus, and he now appeals. 
 II. 
  
 Simmons contends that the manner in which the 
prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges violated the 
federal and state law principles articulated in Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), and State v. 
Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986).  In Batson, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the prosecution from exercising 
peremptory challenges to exclude potential petit jurors based on 
race or race-based assumptions.  476 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. at 
1719.  Similarly, in Gilmore, the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that its state constitution prohibits the prosecution's use of 
peremptory challenges "to remove potential petit jurors who are 
members of a cognizable group on the basis of their presumed 
group bias."  511 A.2d at 1154.  Before analyzing the merits of 
Simmons' peremptory challenge claim, we must resolve two 
preliminary issues:  (1) whether Batson and Gilmore apply to this 
case, and (2) whether Simmons' claim is barred under the 
"adequate and independent state ground" doctrine.2 
 A.   
 In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986) 
(per curiam), the Court concluded that Batson does not apply 
retroactively on collateral review of a final conviction.  Id. at 
258, 106 S. Ct. at 2879.  In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 
                     
2
.  The parties do not dispute and our review reveals that 
Simmons properly exhausted his peremptory challenge claim, and 
speedy appeal claim, in the state courts.  See Rose v. Lundy, 455 
U.S. 509, 518-20, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1203-04 (1982).   
  
107 S. Ct. 708 (1987), however, the Court held that Batson does 
apply "to litigation pending on direct state or federal review or 
not yet final when Batson was decided."  Id. at 316, 107 S. Ct. 
at 709.  It reasoned that the integrity of judicial review 
requires consistent application of "our best understanding of 
governing constitutional principles," id. at 323, 107 S. Ct. at 
713 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679, 91 S. 
Ct. 1160, 1173 (1971)), and fairness requires allegiance to "the 
principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same."  
Id.   
 Here, Simmons' 1977 conviction did not become final 
until 1991 when the United States Supreme Court denied his 
petition for a writ of certiorari.  See Allen, 478 U.S. at 258 
n.1, 106 S. Ct. at 2880 n.1 (citation omitted).  Although this 
case was before the Supreme Court in 1982, in conjunction with 
Simmons' efforts to get a direct appeal, it did not then become 
final in the relevant sense.  Simmons' first appeal as of right 
was the critical missing step, and his intervening applications 
for collateral review did not render his conviction final.  See 
Caspari v. Bohlen, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994).  
Accordingly, the Batson decision, announced in 1986, applies to 
this case.   
 The irony is that the egregious delay in granting 
Simmons a direct appeal inadvertently gave him the benefit of the 
Batson decision.  Had Simmons received a timely review, his 
conviction would have been final before 1986.  In a sense, he is 
a "chance beneficiary" of the Batson rule.  See Griffith, 479 
  
U.S. at 323, 107 S. Ct. at 713.  Simmons, however, was not 
similarly situated with other defendants convicted in 1977 whose 
convictions became final before Batson was decided.  Those other 
defendants did not suffer a 13-year delay before getting 
appellate review, and we see no reason to bend the rule in 
Griffith to deny Simmons the constitutional protection afforded 
in Batson. 
 B. 
 The Gilmore court itself delineated its holding's rule 
of application:   
 [T]he new rule will apply to this defendant, trials in 
which the jury selection commenced on or after the date 
of the Appellate Division opinion [which was affirmed 
in Gilmore], and cases now on appeal in which the issue 
was preserved in the trial court and the record is 
adequate to raise the issue. 
511 A.2d at 1169.  Applying these instructions, the Appellate 
Division rejected Simmons' contention that the reconstructed 
trial record was insufficient to permit it to review his Gilmore 
claim.  It held that Simmons' argument "must of necessity fail 
because we consider this to be attempting a retroactive 
application of Gilmore under the procedural history and 
circumstances of this case."3  The Appellate Division's opinion 
                     
3
.  The Appellate Division noted in passing that Simmons had 
filed no objections to the reconstructed record in the state 
trial court.  Before the reconstruction hearings, however, the 
district court expressly granted Simmons permission to seek its 
ruling on the adequacy question.  Simmons, in fact, challenged 
the sufficiency of the record in the district court, but his 
motion was denied "without prejudice to petitioner's right to 
raise these issues in the state appellate proceedings and in any 
future federal habeas corpus petition following exhaustion of 
state remedies."  We will not presume a procedural default or 
  
yields three potential justifications for this conclusion:  
(1) since Simmons' direct appeal followed his applications for 
collateral review, it was not legitimately "on appeal" for 
purposes of applying Gilmore retroactively, (2) the Gilmore issue 
was not sufficiently "preserved in the trial court," and (3) the 
reconstructed record was not "adequate to raise the issue," and 
the resulting prejudice was appropriately assigned to Simmons.  
 Although its specific rationale was not plainly stated, 
the Appellate Division clearly rendered a decision based on state 
law grounds which was later affirmed by the state supreme court.  
Simmons had also raised a Batson claim in his direct appeal, 
stating in his brief that "the rule of Batson is applicable to 
the case at bar," but the Appellate Division did not address the 
Batson issue.  It relied solely on state law authority and based 
its decision to reject Simmons' peremptory challenge claim on 
Gilmore.  "[I]t is a well-established principle of federalism 
that a state decision resting on an adequate foundation of state 
substantive law is immune from review in the federal courts," 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2503 (1977) 
(citations omitted), and we lack jurisdiction to overrule the 
Appellate Division's conclusion that Gilmore does not apply 
retroactively to Simmons' case.  See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 
296 U.S. 207, 210, 56 S. Ct. 183, 184 (1935) ("where the judgment 
of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal 
(..continued) 
waiver because Simmons apparently relied on the district court's 
assurances. 
  
and the other nonfederal in character, our jurisdiction fails if 
the nonfederal ground is independent of the federal ground and 
adequate to support the judgment").   
 C. 
 Next, we consider whether the Appellate Division's 
dismissal of Simmons' Gilmore claim bars consideration of his 
Batson claim under the "adequate and independent state ground" 
doctrine.  Although Simmons raised a Batson claim in his reopened 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court only 
analyzed the Appellate Division's dismissal under Gilmore.  
Simmons v. Arvonio, 796 F. Supp. 777, 790 (D.N.J. 1992).  The 
district court concluded that this dismissal was not reviewable 
because it was based on substantive state law and disposed of 
Simmons' peremptory challenge claim.  Id. (citing Sykes, 433 U.S. 
at 81, 97 S. Ct. at 2503).  For the following reasons, we 
conclude that the district court erred. 
 In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546 
(1991), the Court reiterated that it "will not review a question 
of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that 
court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the 
federal question and adequate to support the judgment."  Id. at    
729, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-54.  Here, the Appellate Division's 
judgment on Simmons' state Gilmore claim was clearly 
"independent" of his federal Batson claim.  The court cited no 
federal case law and did not refer to the Fourteenth Amendment or 
Batson decision in concluding that Gilmore did not apply 
retroactively to Simmons' case.  Moreover, the Gilmore court 
  
explicitly based its decision "on the New Jersey Constitution, 
which protects fundamental rights independently of the United 
States Constitution."  511 A.2d at 1157.4  The Appellate 
Division's decision under Gilmore, however, was not "adequate" to 
support its judgment.  The unavailability of a state 
constitutional claim is not dispositive as to the availability or 
merits of an analogous federal constitutional claim: 
 [T]he federal habeas petitioner who claims he is 
detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court 
in violation of the United States Constitution is 
entitled to have the federal habeas court make its own 
independent determination of this federal claim without 
being bound by the determination on the merits of that 
claim reached in the state proceedings. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87, 97 S. Ct. at 2506-07.   
 If the Appellate Division had explicitly addressed and 
dismissed 
Simmons' Batson 
claim based on 
its analysis of 
federal law, 
then this claim 
would clearly 
be subject to 
federal habeas 
                     
4
.  Although the protections afforded under Batson and Gilmore 
are overlapping, the two cases rest on different foundations.  
See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 859 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing dual protection of New Jersey and federal 
constitutions); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 814, 827 (N.J. 1992) 
(same). 
  
review.  For 
example, if it 
had dismissed 
both the 
Gilmore and 
Batson claims 
on state and 
federal 
retroactivity 
grounds, then 
its judgment 
regarding the 
retroactive 
application of 
Batson would be 
subject to 
review.  
Conversely, if 
the Appellate 
Division had 
ruled that 
Simmons waived 
his Batson 
claim based on 
state 
procedural law, 
then its 
  
judgment would 
be immune from 
federal review.  
But, dismissing 
a state 
constitutional 
claim on state 
law grounds 
does not 
preclude 
federal habeas 
review of a 
parallel 
federal 
constitutional 
claim.    
 III. 
 A. 
 The first issue is whether Simmons' Batson claim is 
preserved for review.  During the reconstruction hearings, 
Simmons' trial counsel testified as follows: 
     Q: Do you recall making a motion for mistrial on the basis 
that the State was improperly excluding blacks on the 
basis of race? 
 
     A: Again, I cannot say with certainty that I made such a 
motion.  I don't have an independent recollection of 
it.  I probably would have given the flavor and the 
context of this case, et cetera, that I would have made 
such a motion.  Although, I cannot say that I -- I 
can't say, categorically, that I did.  I probably did, 
but I can't say that. 
  
In response to a question about the timing of the motion, he 
stated that:  "I don't have an independent recollection, but I 
would think that I definitely made it before the jury was sworn.  
I would not make it after the fact."  Finally, counsel attested 
that:  "At that time I was making the motion, not in every case, 
but I recall making a motion for a systematic exclusion by the 
State in several other cases during that period of time."   
 The assistant prosecutor's testimony is not to the 
contrary.  He testified as follows:   
     Q: Do you recall the defense making a motion for a 
mistrial charging that the State systematically 
excluded black jurors? 
 
     A: No.  I believe that that happened, after reviewing 
notes that Judge Marchese made, but without having 
reviewed those notes, I would have no recollection of 
that occurring. 
Although the notes of the judge who presided over the voir dire, 
Judge Leopizzi, do not refer to a defense motion based on 
systematic exclusion, the file of the judge who presided over the 
trial and sentencing, Judge Marchese, includes the following 
notation:  "Defense motion for mistrial charging State with 
systematically excluding blacks from jury.  Leopizzi denied."  
The court clerk's records indicate that defense counsel made 
several motions for a mistrial before the jury was sworn, 
although they do not specify the grounds for these motions.  
Based on this record, we are satisfied that Simmons' Batson claim 
was preserved for appeal. 
 B. 
  
 Having asserted a claim that the prosecution based its 
peremptory challenges on race, Simmons had the burden of 
establishing a prima facie case.  A Batson analysis proceeds in 
three steps:  (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing 
of a violation, (2) if the defendant succeeds, the prosecution 
must articulate a race-neutral explanation, and (3) the trial 
court must then determine whether the defendant has proven 
purposeful discrimination.  See United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 
F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1865-66 (1991)), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).  In United States v. 
Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835, 109 
S. Ct. 97 (1988), we elaborated on the first step of a Batson 
analysis, listing five factors that are relevant to a prima facie 
case:  (1) the number of racial group members in the panel, (2) 
the nature of the crime, (3) the race of the defendant and the 
victim, (4) a pattern of strikes against racial group members, 
and (5) the prosecution's questions and statements during the 
voir dire.  Id. at 748.   
 By the time of the reconstruction hearings, eleven 
years after Simmons' trial, defense counsel did not recall how 
many African Americans were in the venire, how many were struck 
by the prosecution, or how many were seated as jurors.  The 
transcript from a pre-trial hearing held the day after the jury 
had been selected, however, records defense counsel's estimate 
that 130 potential jurors had been questioned.  Additionally, 
trial transcripts disclose that, following an in-court 
  
identification of Simmons, defense counsel stated:  "Let the 
record reflect that he pointed to the defendant, Simmons.  The 
only black male in the courtroom except for Mr. Jones, Juror 
number 2."   
 The assistant prosecutor similarly did not remember the 
total number of people in the venire, or its racial composition.   
He testified during the reconstruction hearings that "there could 
have been" as many as 20 African Americans, but that he did not 
think "there would have been" as many as 40.  The assistant 
prosecutor recalled juror number two, the foreperson of the jury, 
as being an African American man, and he was "quite sure" that 
there were other African American venirepersons besides juror 
number two.  He did not know how many peremptory challenges he 
used to strike African Americans from the jury.  The court 
clerk's records reflect that both sides used all of their 
peremptory challenges:  "Fourteen jurors in the box and all 
challenges have been exhausted."   
 Simmons is African American and thus a member of a 
cognizable racial group.  Based on his motion for a mistrial 
"charging [the] State with systematically excluding blacks from 
[the] jury," we conclude that the prosecution struck at least one 
potential African American juror.  See Clemons, 843 F.2d at 747 
(striking single juror could constitute prima facie case).  The 
fact that juror number two was African American is not 
dispositive.  See id. ("mere presence of a single black on the 
jury would not necessarily prevent a finding of a prima facie 
case").  It appears that between 20 and 40 other African 
  
Americans may have been in the venire, although defense counsel 
and the assistant prosecutor were unable to recall with 
certainty.   
 The nature of the crime and its racial configuration -- 
the murder and robbery of an elderly caucasian physician by a 
young African American man -- contribute significantly to 
Simmons' prima facie case.  See Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 971 
(3d Cir. 1993) (considering substantive charge, "robbery of an 
elderly white man by a black man," in analyzing defendant's prima 
facie case).  Presumably recognizing the potential that the trial 
would become racially charged, the judge specifically questioned 
"jurors about the fact that the victim in this case was white, 
[and] the defendant was black, [] attempting to ascertain whether 
jurors would have any difficulty with this."  See also id. at 971 
n.5 (noting that the trial court had asked the venire whether the 
respective race of the defendant and alleged victim would affect 
their judgment).   
 Although we cannot evaluate the last two Clemons 
factors because transcripts of the voir dire are not available, 
we conclude that Simmons has established a prima facie case of a 
Batson violation.  The combination of Simmons' race, the 
prosecution's exclusion of at least one potential African 
American juror, and the circumstances surrounding the crime are 
sufficient to meet Simmons' prima facie burden.  Thus, our focus 
shifts to the prosecution and its ability to come forward with 
race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges.   
 C. 
  
 In Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct. 
410 (1971), the Supreme Court reiterated that "[i]n all cases the 
duty of the State is to provide the indigent as adequate and 
effective an appellate review as that given appellants with 
funds."  Id. at 193-94, 92 S. Ct. at 414 (quoting Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496, 83 S. Ct. 774, 779 (1963)).  "In 
terms of a trial record, this means that the State must afford 
the indigent a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper 
consideration of [his or her] claims."  Id. at 194, 92 S. Ct. at 
414 (internal quotations omitted).  Although a full verbatim 
transcript is not automatically required, the Mayer Court 
concluded that an "appellant cannot be denied a 'record of 
sufficient completeness' to permit proper consideration of his 
claims."  Id. at 198, 92 S. Ct. at 416; see also Karabin v. 
Petsock, 758 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir.) (holding that defendant must 
show "colorable need" for complete transcript), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 857, 106 S. Ct. 163 (1985). 
 The problem here is self-evident.  No one recalls how 
many potential African American jurors were peremptorily 
challenged, and the assistant prosecutor does not remember and 
has no notes indicating why he struck individual venirepersons.  
Both parties agree that further reconstruction hearings would be 
fruitless.  Simmons' Batson claim simply cannot be reviewed 
without a transcript of the voir dire to allow the reviewing 
court to examine whom the assistant prosecutor excluded and why.  
We do not and cannot know whether Simmons' jury selection process 
was infected by racial discrimination. 
  
 Nevertheless, Simmons raised a colorable claim that the 
prosecution systematically excluded African Americans from the 
jury, and the prejudice stemming from our inability to review 
this claim is not fairly borne by him.5  The seriousness of this 
claim and its potential merit demand some form of habeas relief.  
As explained by the Batson Court, "[t]he core guarantee of equal 
protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not 
discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to 
approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, 
which arise solely from the jurors' race."  476 U.S. at 97-98, 
106 S. Ct. at 1723.  It would be a grinding injustice to Simmons 
were he to suffer at the hand of a prosecutor who practiced 
racial discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges 
and then contributed to a delay that shielded his actions from 
review.  The potential harm extends beyond Simmons and the 
excluded jurors:  "Selection procedures that purposefully exclude 
black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the 
fairness of our system of justice."  Id. at 87, 106 S. Ct. at 
1718.   
 IV. 
 Simmons contends that the 13-year delay also violated 
his right to due process and a speedy appeal, providing another 
                     
5
.  The district court opinion granting Simmons a conditional 
writ of habeas corpus details defense counsel's actions and non-
actions with respect to obtaining trial transcripts and the 
state's failure to preserve the necessary materials for preparing 
transcripts.  See Simmons v. Beyer, 689 F. Supp. 432, 448-49 
(D.N.J. 1988).   
  
basis for habeas relief.  It is axiomatic that once an appeal as 
of right has been granted, "the procedures used in deciding 
appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution."  Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S. Ct. 830, 834 (1985).  The 
constitutional touchstone is that the appellate procedure must 
furnish the components necessary for meaningful review.  See, 
e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358, 83 S. Ct. 814, 
817 (1963) (right to counsel on direct appeal); Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590-91 (1956) (right 
to transcript on direct appeal).  Due process guarantees an 
appeal that is both "adequate and effective."  Evitts, 469 U.S. 
at 392-94, 105 S. Ct. at 834-35.  Since New Jersey provides for 
an appeal as of right, N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 5, ¶ 2, we must 
determine whether the 13-year delay constitutionally impaired the 
appellate review that Simmons eventually received. 
 Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
recognized a criminal defendant's right to a speedy appeal, in 
Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1987) (Burkett I), 
we held that the Due Process Clause "guarantees a reasonably 
speedy appeal if the state has chosen to give defendants the 
right to [appeal]."  Id. at 1221.  Numerous other courts of 
appeals have also acknowledged a due process right to a speedy 
appeal.6  In Burkett I, we applied the criteria articulated in 
                     
6
.  See, e.g., Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1558 (10th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1230 (1994); 
Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1991); United 
  
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), to 
determine whether appellate delay had violated due process.  826 
F.2d at 1222; accord Harris, 15 F.3d at 1559; Tucker, 8 F.3d at 
676; Johnson, 732 F.2d at 381-82; Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303.  In 
Barker, the Supreme Court identified four factors to balance when 
examining an alleged speedy trial violation:  "Length of delay, 
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, 
and prejudice to the defendant."  407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 
2192.  Although the interests at stake before trial and before 
appeal obviously differ, they are sufficiently similar to warrant 
the same general approach.  See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 
27, 94 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1973) (Barker factors may carry 
"different weight where a defendant is incarcerated after 
conviction"); Cody, 936 F.2d at 719 ("Barker factors should not 
be applied uncritically" in speedy appeal context).   
 The 13-year delay in this case is an outrage, and that 
Simmons' appeal as of right "slipped through the cracks" is 
shameful.  See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1225 (five and one-half 
year delay in sentencing and appeal warranted discharge); cf. 
Harris, 15 F.3d at 1560 (two-year appellate delay ordinarily 
gives rise to a presumption of inordinate delay).  The subsequent 
(..continued) 
States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 381 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1033, 105 S. Ct. 505 (1984); United States v. Pratt, 645 
F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881, 102 S. Ct. 
369 (1981); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S. Ct. 1392 (1981); cf. Allen v. 
Duckworth, 6 F.3d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1993) (assuming excessive 
delay in appeal can violate due process), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994).   
  
period of litigation marking Simmons' efforts to obtain a direct 
appeal apparently took on a life of its own, without regard for 
fundamental notions of fairness and due process.   
 The district court's finding that the reason for the 
delay was ineffective assistance by appointed trial counsel and 
the Public Defender is clearly correct.  See Simmons, 689 F. 
Supp. at 443-44.  We recognize that "nominal representation on 
appeal violates due process because 'a party whose counsel is 
unable to provide effective representation is in no better 
position than one who has no counsel at all.'"  Simmons v. 
Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Evitts, 469 
U.S. at 396, 105 S. Ct. at 836).  Responsibility for this delay 
cannot be charged against Simmons, the victim of ineffective 
lawyers.  See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562 (delay caused by Public 
Defender's inability to timely perfect an appeal should not be 
attributed to petitioner); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th 
Cir. 1990) ("failures of court-appointed counsel and delays by 
the court are attributable to the state").  In contrast to his 
lawyers' performance, Simmons himself timely requested and 
diligently sought appellate review.  See Simmons, 689 F. Supp. at 
435-36 (summarizing state court findings regarding Simmons' 
actions).   
 Simmons has been undeniably prejudiced by the 13-year 
delay.  In Burkett I, we adopted a modified version of the three 
interests identified in Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 
2193, as being relevant to prejudice in a speedy trial context.  
  
Accordingly, we assess prejudice in light of the following 
interests in promoting timely appeals: 
 (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending 
appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of 
those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; 
and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted 
person's grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in 
case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired. 
Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1222 (quoting Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303 
n.8).   
 Here, the third factor is dispositive:  Simmons' claim 
on appeal that the prosecution systematically excluded African 
Americans from the jury is no longer reviewable.  This is not a 
case in which deprivation of a timely appeal has engendered "the 
possibility that a convicted person's grounds for appeal, and his 
or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial might be 
impaired."  Id. at 1225 (quoting Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8).  
Simmons has suffered actual prejudice because his Batson claim is 
unreviewable on the reconstructed record.  Cf. United States v. 
Wilson, 16 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 1994) (judicial bias claim 
unreviewable because of long-delayed and woefully inadequate 
trial transcript).  Moreover, an impediment to a ground for 
appeal is the most serious form of prejudice "because the 
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his [or her] case 
skews the fairness of the entire system."  Barker, 407 U.S. at 
532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193.   
 Each Barker factor indicates that the 13-year appellate 
delay violated Simmons' right to due process and a speedy appeal.  
We agree with the district court that due process was violated, 
  
but disagree that the violation was cured when the Appellate 
Division granted him the right to appeal.  See Simmons, 796 F. 
Supp. at 791.  If Simmons had received an adequate and effective, 
though excessively delayed appeal, then the issue of prejudice 
would become more difficult.7  However, the delay in this case 
"substantially affect[ed] the fairness of the appellate 
proceeding," Cody, 936 F.2d at 722, and we conclude that the due 
process violation caused by the delay compels some form of habeas 
relief. 
 V. 
 Having concluded that Simmons is entitled to relief for 
both his potentially meritorious, but unreviewable, Batson claim 
and his speedy appeal claim, we consider what relief is 
appropriate.  The two violations are intertwined:  Simmons' 
                     
7
.  See  Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1994) (11½-
year delay in hearing motion to withdraw guilty plea did not 
warrant habeas relief where petitioner's ability to show coercion 
was not impaired), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. June 2, 1994) 
(No. 93-9464); Harris, 15 F.3d at 1566 (once conviction affirmed, 
no entitlement to habeas relief "unless the petitioner can show 
actual prejudice to the appeal, itself, arising from the delay"); 
Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676 (despite three and one half year delay, 
once his conviction was affirmed, petitioner received all he was 
due from the legal process); Allen, 6 F.3d at 460 (despite a four 
and one half year delay, habeas corpus action became moot once 
petitioner's conviction was affirmed); Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968 
F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir.) (13-year delay prior to direct appeal 
does not warrant habeas relief where conviction was ultimately 
affirmed because there was no actual prejudice), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 664 (1992); Johnson, 732 F.2d at 382-83 
(once appeal was heard and found lacking in merit, there was no 
basis for ordering defendant's release).  But cf. Doggett v. 
United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1992) 
("Thus we generally have to recognize that excessive delay 
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that 
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify."). 
  
Batson claim eludes review because the delay in his direct appeal 
resulted in the loss or destruction of the voir dire transcripts, 
and his speedy appeal claim satisfies the prejudice requirement 
because the delay impaired appellate review of his Batson claim.
 In Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1994) cert. 
denied, Heiser v. Stepenik, 115 S. Ct. 313 (1994), we asserted 
that:  "One of the most troublesome issues that faces a federal 
court sitting on a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus is 
the appropriate remedy to fashion when the state proceedings have 
been characterized by excessive and indefensible delay."  Id. at 
300.  Our task is "to fashion relief designed to rectify the 
prejudice of the violation."  Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431, 
1447 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 3055 
(1992).   
 The usual remedy for a Batson violation is to grant a 
petition for habeas corpus, but allow the state an opportunity to 
retry the petitioner before a properly selected jury.  See Jones, 
987 F.2d at 975 (remanding for district court "to grant the writ 
without prejudice to the Commonwealth retrying the case"); 
Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir.) (affirming order 
"granting the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus and requiring 
the Commonwealth to either retry the petitioner within 90 days or 
release him"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003, 111 S. Ct. 568 
(1990).  Although Simmons has raised a hybrid Batson claim, which 
draws on equal protection and due process concepts and is based 
on our inability to review his Batson allegations, we believe 
that the same remedy should apply.  For a speedy trial violation, 
  
the typical remedy seeks "to counteract any resulting prejudice 
demonstrated by a petitioner."  Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1222.  
Thus, we recognize that a "discharge is warranted where 
attempting an alternate remedy would not vitiate the prejudice of 
the fundamental unfairness or would itself violate a petitioner's 
constitutional rights."  Id. (citations omitted). 
 "[H]abeas courts ordinarily have fashioned a remedy 
designed to spur the state courts to fulfilling their 
constitutional obligations to the defendant."  Heiser, 15 F.3d at 
306 (citations omitted).  Here, Simmons' right to a jury 
selection process that is untainted by racial discrimination is 
at the core of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.  
Accordingly, the constitutional integrity of his current 
confinement is seriously in question.  Given the monumental delay 
in this case and Simmons' constitutionally suspect incarceration, 
we have considered whether an unconditional release would be 
appropriate.  Our difficulty lies in our inability to know 
whether the prosecution, in fact, systematically excluded African 
Americans from the jury.  If it were possible to review Simmons' 
Batson claim, and it were found to be without merit, then the 
prejudice stemming from the delay alone would be a slender reed 
on which to support his unconditional release.  See Simmons, 898 
F.2d at 869 ("Release from custody is an extraordinary remedy, 
especially in a delay-of-appeal case where release would in 
effect nullify a state court conviction on grounds unrelated to 
the merits of the case.").  We conclude that the relief best 
  
tailored to remedy the prejudice Simmons has suffered is a new 
trial and fair jury selection process. 
 
 
 VI. 
 Therefore, we will reverse the judgment of the district 
court and remand the cause for it to grant Simmons' petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus, give the state an opportunity to retry 
Simmons, and specify the time period within which the state must 
retry or release him. 
                           
Simmons v. Beyer 
No. 93-5370 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
 
 
 In this difficult case, I believe the Court correctly 
applies Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to Simmons's pre-
Batson conviction, even though Simmons raises it in a collateral 
attack on his state conviction.  Compare Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 
255 (1986) (per curiam) (courts should not retroactively apply 
new criminal procedure rule on collateral review of convictions 
becoming final before the new rule is announced) and Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (same) with Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 
U.S. 314 (1987) (courts should retroactively apply a new rule of 
  
criminal procedure to those cases pending on direct review or not 
yet final when the new rule is announced).  I, therefore, concur 
in the result. 
 I agree with the majority that this case is made more 
difficult because the reconstructed record is inadequate to 
review fully the Batson issue.8  This particular difficulty 
implies that Batson's retroactive application to Simmons's case 
is important to the grant of the new trial remedy, which we all 
agree Simmons should be afforded.  The precise retroactivity 
problem this case presents, however, has never been directly 
before us or the Supreme Court.  I write separately because this 
important and unique retroactivity issue warrants an analysis. 
 Like the majority, I am reluctant to hold that the 
State's delay in hearing Simmons's appeal, in and of itself, 
                     
8
.  After concluding that Batson applies, the majority then 
recognizes a "self-evident" problem; i.e., it cannot decide the 
Batson issue because 
 
 [n]o one recalls how many potential African 
American jurors were peremptorily challenged, 
and the assistant prosecutor does not 
remember and has no notes indicating why he 
struck individual venirepersons.  Both 
parties agree that further reconstruction 
hearings would be fruitless.  Simmons' Batson 
claim simply cannot be reviewed without a 
transcript of the voir dire to allow the 
reviewing court to examine whom the assistant 
prosecutor excluded and why.  We do not and 
cannot know whether Simmons' jury selection 
process was infected by racial 
discrimination. 
 
See Majority Op. at 15.  Simmons, indeed, concedes as much.  See 
Brief for Appellant Brief at 26. 
  
establishes sufficient prejudice permitting us to conclude, as a 
matter of law, that his general due process right to a speedy 
appeal has been violated.  See Opinion of Court, typescript at 
20-21.  My decision, thus, rests not only upon the determination 
that this court should apply Batson, but also on two other 
critical factors; namely, the State's inordinate delay in 
granting Simmons's right of appeal and the partial loss of 
certain voir dire transcripts.9  It is the concurrent existence 
of these three factorsincluding the sad failure of New 
Jersey's otherwise generally efficient judicial system to provide 
Simmons with a reasonably prompt and adequate appeal of his 1977 
murder conviction that allows us to grant the remedy of a new 
trial. 
 The first factor is the State's excessive delay, nearly 
fourteen years, in granting Simmons's right of appeal.  As we 
held in Burkett, 826 F.2d at 1221, a state's delay in affording a 
convicted person a direct appeal, as of right, may violate his 
general Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, as opposed to 
the more specific Sixth Amendment speedy trial right available to 
                     
9
.  At the very least, this rationale avoids any need to remand 
this case for further fact finding on the prejudice issue.  See 
Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 771 (3d Cir. 1993) (remand for 
further fact finding on cause of delay relating to speedy trial 
issue); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1227 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(remand on one of three convictions to make a determination 
concerning prejudice).  Any further delay in this case is 
undesirable.  Hence, like the majority, I favor simplifying the 
prejudice issue by avoiding reliance solely on the delay Simmons 
has suffered.  See Majority Op. at 20-21 ("If Simmons had 
received an adequate and effective, though excessively delayed 
appeal, then the issue of prejudice would become more 
difficult."). 
  
state prisoners under the incorporation doctrine.  Id. at 1219.  
In Burkett, we partially analogized the right to a speedy appeal 
with the right to a speedy trial, but modified speedy appeal 
analysis to emphasize the importance of a finding of prejudice.  
Instead of prejudice being merely a key factor or the "most 
important factor," see Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 760, we stated that 
"prejudice is generally a necessary . . . element of a due 
process claim."  Burkett, 826 F.2d at 1221 (quoting United States 
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).  In adapting the 
"prejudice" factor to the judgment of appellate delays, we then 
delineated three interests that are protected by prompt appeals: 
 (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration 
pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety 
and concern of those convicted awaiting the 
outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation 
of the possibility that a convicted person's 
grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses 
in case of reversal and retrial, might be 
impaired. 
 
 
Id. at 1222. 
 Having made these observations, we nevertheless refused 
to hold that an on-going, combined delay of at least five years 
and three months in sentencing Burkett and processing his appeal 
established prejudice as a matter of law as to one of his three 
convictions.  Id. at 1227.  Instead, we remanded Burkett's case 
to the district court for fact finding as to prejudice and 
thereafter for balancing the degree of prejudice, if any, with 
the other Barker factors to determine whether Burkett's right to 
a speedy appeal had been violated.  Id.; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 
  
U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (enunciating four factors to consider in 
speedy trial analysis). 
 The second critical factor in this case concerns the 
loss of the transcript relating to the voir dire of Simmons's 
jurors before he received his direct appeal nunc pro tunc as a 
result of his federal habeas petition.  This partial loss of the 
transcript is material on prejudice only if Batson applies 
retroactively to Simmons's case.10  The majority relies on the 
loss of this part of the trial transcript in holding that this 
case involves prejudice as a matter of law.  I, too, believe this 
fact weighs heavily.  It permits us easily to conclude that the 
reconstructed record is inadequate to afford Simmons an adequate 
and effective appeal.  See Majority Op. at 15.  Thus, the 
majority states:  "we cannot evaluate the last two Clemons 
factors because transcripts of the voir dire are not 
available. . . ."  Majority Op. at 14; see United States v. 
Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 
(1988).11 
                     
10
.  It is the inability to review the Batson issue, not a 
violation of Batson itself, that is material to our finding of 
prejudice in this case.  Simmons also argues that the loss of the 
voir dire and other transcript parts affected his ability to 
establish that his trial in the Patterson vicinage was 
constitutionally unfair entitling him to have his motions for a 
venue or venire change granted. I believe this argument lacks 
merit and, like the majority, am unable to discern any other 
issue Simmons has raised for which the reconstructed record is 
inadequate.  See Majority Op. at 2 n.1. 
11
.  Interestingly, the majority then concludes that the 
reconstructed record is sufficient to show a prima facie Batson 
claim.  See Majority Op. at 14.  In so concluding, I believe the 
majority goes beyond Simmons's argument.  As I read his brief, he 
  
 Thus, as noted, it is clear that Batson's retroactive 
application to this collateral attack on Simmons's pre-Batson 
conviction is essential to our mandate requiring New Jersey to 
grant Simmons a new trial within a reasonable time, to be 
determined by the district court, or release him.  I turn now to 
an analysis of the retroactivity issue. 
 In Griffith, the text of the Supreme Court's holding 
states that Batson is to be applied to all cases "pending on 
direct review or not yet final" at the time Batson was decided.  
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.  Additionally, the Griffith court 
stated that "final" "mean[s] a case in which a judgment of 
conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal 
exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or 
a petition for certiorari finally denied."  Id. at 321 n.6 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Accord Allen, 478 U.S. at 
258 n.1 (citation omitted).  Because of the inordinate delay in 
Simmons's appeal that is attendant upon the circumstances of this 
case, he had not yet "exhausted" the "availability of appeal" 
when Batson was decided.  In fact, his direct appeal, which took 
place after Batson, was not decided until nearly fourteen years 
after he was convicted, albeit only nunc pro tunc, as a result of 
the district court's earlier order in this habeas proceeding. 
(..continued) 
argues he cannot make a prima facie showing of a Batson violation 
on the reconstructed record.  See Brief of Appellant at 26.  
Whether we analyze Simmons's case on the basis of this concession 
or, as the majority does, it is the deficiency in the 
reconstructed record with respect to the voir dire transcript 
that establishes irremediable prejudice to Simmons. 
  
 It can at least be argued, however, that literal 
application of Griffith's text to Simmons's case is in tension 
with one of the Griffith rationales.  Simmons is not similarly 
situated to Batson, Griffith, or Brown (the petitioner whose case 
the Supreme Court consolidated with Griffith).  Rather, Simmons, 
convicted in December 1977 of a brutal murder on strong but not 
overwhelming evidence, is a "chance beneficiary" of counsel's 
failure to secure him the timely, direct appeal that the State of 
New Jersey grants as a matter of right to all persons convicted 
of a crime.12  See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327.  Griffith, Brown, 
and Batson were tried in the same court within three months of 
each other.  Id.  The same prosecutor presented the State's case 
against all three and appears to have used peremptory challenges 
to deny them the right to be judged by an impartial jury, from 
which no person was excluded because of race.  Id. 
 Simmons was tried almost ten years before Batson was 
even decided.  Except for his counsels' inattention, his appeal 
would have been filed in January 1978, within 45 days of his 
conviction or, at least, no more than 30 days thereafter.13  And, 
                     
12
.  Once a state gives a convicted criminal defendant a right to 
appeal, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause requires the 
State to provide an adequate means, including effective 
assistance of counsel, to process the appeal.  See Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
13
.  New Jersey Rule 2:4-4(a) permits its appellate courts to 
extend the time for appeal by 30 days.  Compare New Jersey R. 
2:4-4(a) (1995) ("The appellate court, upon a showing of good 
cause and the absence of prejudice, may extend the time fixed by 
R. 2:4-1(a) (final judgment) . . . for a period not exceeding 30 
days, but only if the notice of appeal or notice of petition for 
certification was in fact served and filed within the time as 
  
with the consequent likelihood that the appellate process would 
have been completed long before Batson, Simmons's conviction 
would have become unassailable.14 
 I do not believe it can fairly be said that Simmons, 
unlike Griffith or Brown, will suffer from any "actual inequity" 
if Batson's new rule is not retroactively applied to his 1977 
conviction.  See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327-28.  Whatever 
inequities may exist press upon other persons who were convicted 
by juries from which African Americans were shamefully excluded 
and then had those convictions affirmed in timely appeals before 
Batson was decided, or perhaps the people of New Jersey who may 
fail to understand how a person convicted of direct participation 
in the brutal murder of an elderly doctor, who ventured into the 
streets in the middle of the night to respond to an emergency, is 
afforded a new trial or released. 
 Indeed, at first glance it might appear that Simmons 
has been saved by the legal fiction of an appeal nunc pro tunc 
(..continued) 
extended.") with Notice to Appellate Bar, 100 N.J.L.J. 1208 
(1977) ("The Supreme Court has directed the Appellate Division to 
relax Rule 2:4-4(a) in favor of allowing an out-of-time appeal 
nunc pro tunc on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant in any 
case where it satisfactorily appears that the defendant, 
personally, within time, requested his trial counsel or the 
Public Defender's Office to file an appeal on his behalf.").  
Unfortunately, the State did not appreciate the need to relax the 
strict time limits on appeal with respect to Simmons's case.  If 
it had, this habeas proceeding might well have been avoided. 
14
.  I use the term "unassailable" because I agree with the Court 
that none of the issues Simmons has raised, except his hybrid due 
process-equal protection claim based on Batson and the State's 
inability to afford him adequate appellate review in a timely 
fashion, have merit.  See Majority Op. at 2 n.1. 
  
that is no less a fiction because it is stated in a dead, ancient 
language.15  Put simply, direct review was still available in 
Simmons's case when Batson was decided only as a result of a 
federal court's collateral review of his state court conviction 
which otherwise had every appearance of finality. 
 In addition, literal application of the Griffith 
holding to Simmons's case creates tension between Griffith, which 
espoused a bright line rule favoring retroactivity in all cases 
that are "pending on direct review or not yet final," and Teague, 
where the Supreme Court barred retroactive application of Batson, 
and other cases wherein a new constitutional principle of 
criminal procedure that clearly breaks with past precedent is 
announced, to cases on collateral review.16  Here, but for the 
collateral attack, which Simmons successfully pursued in this 
federal habeas proceeding, his New Jersey conviction would have 
almost certainly been "final" before Batson was decided. 
                     
15
.  This particular fictitious form of time travel may merely 
reflect the vestigial survival of the common law rule that courts 
lack jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal.  It fails, however, 
to disguise the fact that Simmons's conviction had every 
appearance of finality long before Batson, but is now subject to 
review only by virtue of this collateral proceeding. 
16
.  The two exceptions espoused in Teague, which require the 
retroactive application of a new rule if it (1) "places 'certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of 
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,'" Teague, 489 
U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 
(1972) (Harlan, J., concurring)), and (2) "implicate[s] the 
fundamental fairness of the trial" and factual innocence, id. at 
312, do not apply here. 
  
 Griffith itself did not directly address the problem of 
applying Batson to nunc pro tunc appeals.  As a result, it is 
arguably distinguishable on its facts from Simmons's case.  
Indeed, Griffith, Allen, and Teague are all factually 
distinguishable from Simmons's case.  Nevertheless, I think 
Griffith should be applied to this and all other cases involving 
appeals nunc pro tunc, not only because such a decision comports 
with a literal reading of Griffith's holding, but also because of 
Griffith's genesis in Justice Harlan's objections to the case 
specific approach to retroactivity adopted in Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).  See Mackey v. United States, 401 
U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 The application of new rules to any case pending on 
direct review when the rule is announced, including appeals nunc 
pro tunc resulting from a collateral attack on a conviction, 
seems to me to represent a reasonable compromise between the 
unfairness incident to retroactive application of any procedural 
rule to trial proceedings concluded before the new rule is 
announced and the temptation of legislative free wheeling that 
courts confront when they are permitted prospectively to apply 
new departures in the law.  Moreover, the application of new law 
to appeals nunc pro tunc does not seem to be inconsistent with 
the views of Justice Harlan or that of Justice Powell in his 
concurrence in Griffith, which states: 
 It is to be hoped that the Court then will 
adopt the Harlan view of retroactivity in 
cases seeking relief on habeas petitions.  
  
Under that view, habeas petitions generally 
should be judged according to the 
constitutional standards existing at the time 
of conviction. 
 
 
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 (Powell, J., concurring).17 
 It is perhaps unfortunate that retroactive application 
of Batson is required to grant Simmons any effective relief.18  
His only viable constitutional claim, which the Court describes 
as a hybrid equal protection-due process claim, results from a 
combination of the Batson problem, New Jersey's long delay in 
granting Simmons his right to appeal, and the consequent loss of 
part of the trial transcript material to Batson.  Nevertheless, I 
am satisfied with the result reached by the Court.  Accordingly, 
I concur with its decision to vacate the district court's order 
denying Simmons's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remand 
with instructions conditionally to grant the writ, unless the 
State grants Simmons a new trial within a reasonable time, to be 
determined by the district court. 
                     
17
.  In his reference to Justice Harlan's view on retroactivity, 
Justice Powell may be using the term "convicted" interchangeably 
with the term "final."  See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 682-83 (Harlan, 
J. concurring); see also Griffith, 479 U.S. at 329 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) (new constitutional rules governing criminal 
prosecutions should not apply in collateral proceedings 
challenging convictions that become final before the rule is 
announced). 
18
.  It is doubly unfortunate because neither Simmons himself nor 
the State had given us any analysis of the retroactivity problem 
and, by his reliance on State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 
1986) (New Jersey's Batson analogue), which plainly does not 
apply to Simmons's case, this Court, the state appellate court, 
and the district court have all been left without the benefit of 
any real advocacy concerning retroactivity as it applies to 
appeals nunc pro tunc. 
